Introduction
Invariably, markets echo and reverberate major political changes and events.
Ample empirical evidence shows that economic agents and markets react to exogenous incidents -anthropogenic or natural, adjust and adapt to the broader political environment as it evolves and changes (inter alia: Pástor and Veronesi, 2013; Kaplanski and Levy, 2010; Berkman et al. 2011; Hudson and Uruhart, 2015; Dimic et al. 2016) . In particular, the characteristics and the dynamics of the domestic as well as the international political environment significantly affect the economy, markets and market agents' sentiment and behavior (inter alia: Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2009; Bialkowski et al. 2008; Fielding, 2003; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2008) . Fluctuations in the political scene or one-off events can exert a noteworthy effect in equity markets; in the cross correlation of assets; in portfolio allocation and diversification decisions (inter alia: Omar et al. 2016; Asteriou and Siriopoulos, 2003) . Events such as elections, governmental changes, political upheavals, civil strife or more violent episodes such as terrorist attacks, affect economic performance and asset markets (inter alia: Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2010; Drakos and Kallandranis, 2015; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2009) . Similarly, armed conflicts, be it intrastate or interstate, or simply geopolitical friction and tension generate significant levels of risk and uncertainty and invariably leave an indelible and traceable mark on global markets (inter alia: Zussman et al. 2008; Choudhry, 2010; Kucher, 2000, 2001; Schneider and Troeger, 2006) . Depending on the type of the event the impact exerted can be short-lived and fade away as time elapses or, it can bring about longer lasting effects and noteworthy shifts in markets influencing portfolio allocation and diversification and the relationship between different markets (inter alia: Pástor and Veronesi, 2013; Kollias et al. 2013a Kollias et al. , 2013b Omar et al. 2016; Aslam and Kang, 2015) . Within the thematic focus of this growing corpus of empirical studies, this paper sets out to examine the impact of geopolitical risk on the oil-stock covariance, their returns and their variances. Using monthly data for WTI oil index and the S&P 500 stock index, this study examines whether and to what extent this relationship is affected by geopolitical risk. To this effect, the recently constructed Caldara and Iacoviello (2016) Geopolitical Risk index (hence forth GPR index) is used 1 . To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the GPR index is used to examine the effects of geopolitical risk on the stock and oil markets association. The time period of the empirical investigation spans over a century from 1899 to 2016. The GPR index is introduced in a multivariate Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) framework 2 . An unrestricted Vector Autoregressive -GARCH model is employed herein for two main reasons. First, the VAR representation permits the identification of the causality direction between two or more variables without explicitly assuming a specific direction. Second, frequently financial time-series like the stock and oil series used here, present time varying variances affecting the validity of the estimated parameters. For this reason, modelling time-varying conditional variances and covariance is regarded as the suitable approach in such cases. In the following section, the data and methodology are presented. The findings are shown and discussed in section three while section four concludes the paper.
1 Available at https://www2.bc.edu/matteo-iacoviello/gpr.htm. 2 Multivariate GARCH models have been widely used to study covariance of stocks and bonds (Longin and Solnik 1995; Kim et al. 2006; Connolly et al. 2005 Connolly et al. , 2007 Yang et al 2009; Kollias et al, 2013b) .
Data and methodology
The relationship between stock markets and oil prices has been extensively examined by a growing body of literature with mixed findings that on balance do not seem to offer any robust and unequivocal empirical evidence (inter alia: Conrad et al. 2014; Nahda and Faff, 2008; Marques and Lopes, 2015; Arouri and Nguyen, 2010; Apergis and Miller, 2009) . If one attempts to summarize the literature in broad terms, two are the main strands that emerge on a theoretical level of argumentation. It has been argued that increases in oil prices may be interpreted by market agents and investors as signaling an impending boom in the economy. To the extent that higher oil prices reflect a propping up of economic activity and hence stronger business performance, this, ceteris paribus, will bring about the concomitant positive effect on stock markets. On the other hand, however, rising oil prices may be signaling the emergence of inflationary pressures. Among others, higher oil prices affect production and transportation costs, generating inflation expectations and curtail consumers' discretionary spending. Ceteris paribus, inflationary pressures can result in upward pressures on interest rates. In turn, this will invariably adversely affect economic activity and hence stock price valuations.
In terms of empirical findings, as shown by a number of recent studies, the relationship between oil and stock prices is not stable and varies significantly across firms, sectors, countries and over time (inter alia: Diaz et al. 2016; Joo and Park, 2017; Mohanty et al. 2016; Reboredo and Ugolini, 2016) . Given the extensive literature on the relationship between oil prices and stock markets, including in the equation of their association the effects of geopolitical risk as quantified by the GPR index, can offer interesting insights on how this relationship is affected by exogenous non-market related factors that emanate from the dynamic and ever evolving international environment that regularly generates tension, friction and confrontation between global actors. As already pointed out above, reported findings show that major exogenous political events such as war, conflict, insurgencies and terrorism have the capacity to bring about noteworthy changes and shifts in equity markets; to influence the relationship between markets and assets, portfolio allocation and diversification, and affect international financial flows such as FDI and international trade (inter alia : Fielding, 2003; Enders et al. 2006; Urquhart and Hudson, 2016; Bandyopadhyay et al. 2014) . In other words, the impact of such violent events are not limited to the scenes of their venue and the battlefields with the associated destruction of human and physical capital, but spill-over and have wider economic repercussions since they affect and rattle the routine of normal economic and social life.
Energy and equity markets can be shaken by profound geopolitical changes and the friction and tension that they invariably generate, as well as by major security risk generating episodes. So can their association (Wacziarg, 2012; Omar et al. 2016; Kollias et al. 2013a) . This is particularly true for the oil markets given the strategic nature of this commodity and the fact that a large share of the global oil supply is produced in the Middle East. A region that historically has been marred by conflict and wars and has dominated the global agenda for many decades. countries are also added, the total share of petroleum producing countries in these geopolitically volatile and unstable regions of the world exceeds 48% for 2015. For instance, in a recent paper that employs the same empirical methodology, Kollias et al. (2013a) examine how the association between the two markets was affected by two wars -the Gulf and Iraq wars in particular -and a number of major terrorist events over the period . The reported findings show that the covariance between stock and oil returns was affected by the two aforementioned wars. A tentative conclusion that the authors reached was that both the Gulf and the Iraq war predisposed investors and market agents for more profound and longer lasting effects on global markets given that both took place in a very volatile, petroleum rich region that produces a substantial share of global oil supply.
An advantage of the GPR index constructed by Caldara and Iacoviello (2016) and used here, is that it offers the opportunity to move beyond the examination of how specific events influence markets, and the economy in general as most studies tend to do (inter alia : Fielding, 2003; Kucher, 2000, 2001; Hudson and Urquhart, 2015; Kollias et al. 2013a Kollias et al. , 2013b . The GPR index used herein broadens the perspective of the investigation since it allows for fluctuations in the level of geopolitical risk, and hence for more reliable inferences and better insights into the effects exerted (Caldara and Iacoviello, 2016) . For instance, focusing on the Middle East region and the post-War period, the strategic instability that has characterized the area has oscillated from major war outbreaks to relatively less intense conflicts, covered in the empirical analysis that follows, the paper hopes to shed light and offer long-term findings on how and to what extent this relationship is affected by exogenous geopolitical and security shocks. GPR is a monthly index that quantifies the risk associated and generated by events such as tensions and frictions between states, confrontations, armed conflicts and war, terrorist acts. The normal course of international relations is directly and often profoundly affected by such events. As shown, the instability, uncertainty and risk generated in such cases is transited to the economy and impacts economic performance, markets, market agents and sentiment (inter alia : Fielding, 2003; Sandler, 2008, 2009; Zussman et al. 2008; Choudhry, 2010; Kollias et al. 2013b; Drakos and Kallandranis, 2015) .
The GPR index is derived by counting the occurrence of words related to geopolitical tensions in leading international newspapers (Caldara and Iacoviello, 2016) . In the graphical representation of the index (Figure 1 ), spikes associated for instance with World War I & II, the collapse of bipolarity, the Kuwait invasion and the Gulf War, the invasion of Iraq are easily identifiable. Undoubtedly, such momentous events were of global importance, having shaped and determined the course of history. Similarly, the impact exerted by one-off events such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor or the 9/11 terrorist attacks -both history shaping incidents -or the November -1900 September-1902 July-1904 May-1906 March-1908 January-1910 November-1911 September-1913 July-1915 May-1917 March-1919 January-1921 November-1922 September-1924 July-1926 May-1928 March-1930 January-1932 November-1933 September-1935 July-1937 May-1939 March-1941 January-1943 November-1944 September-1946 July-1948 May-1950 March-1952 January-1954 November-1955 September-1957 July-1959 May-1961 March-1963 January-1965 November-1966 September-1968 July-1970 May-1972 March-1974 January-1976 November-1977 September-1979 July-1981 May-1983 March-1985 January-1987 November-1988 September-1990 July-1992 May-1994 March-1996 January-1998 November-1999 September-2001 July-2003 May-2005 March-2007 January-2009 November-2010 September-2012 July-2014 May-2016 As already noted, the data used in our empirical estimations for the oil and stock markets, consists of monthly observations for the S&P500 stock index and WTI oil index real returns covering the period January 1899 to August 2016. Note that nominal values of the stock and oil prices are deflated by the Consumer Price Index to obtain the real counterparts of these two series, with data on all these variables derived from the Global Financial Database. In order to examine the impact of the geopolitical events quantified by the GPR index on the oil-stock covariance, their returns and their variances, this index is introduced in a VAR-BEKK-GARCH model.
The multivariate GARCH models specify equations for how the variancescovariances move over time. In 1995 one multivariate GARCH formulation was (1) gives the expression for the conditional mean. 5 The BEKK acronym refers to a specific parameteriztion of the multivariate GARCH model developed in Engle and Kroner (1995) . 6 For a more detailed discussion and survey for multivariate GARCH models see among others Bauwens et al. (2006) 7 Its name is taken by the vectorized representation of the model. Where VECH( ) denotes the operator that stacks the lower triangular portion of a symmetric N×N matrix into an N(N+1)/2×1 vector of the corresponding unique elements. The second moment will take the following form:
where the conditional variance-covariance matrix depends on its past values and on past values of error terms defined on matrix 1 -t ε . 0 C is a 2 × 2 matrix, the elements of which are zero above the main diagonal; and Α , B are 2 × 2 matrices. K, is the coefficient matrix for the geopolitical risk index respectively and the operator "•" is the element by element (Hadamard product). More analytically: 
In order to investigate further any effect of geopolitical risk with a time lag on stocks and oil and for robustness, we estimate a second version of our model by introducing a time lag on the geopolitical risk index i.e. GPR t-1 . Therefore, equations (1) and (2) are modified as follows:
The findings
The analysis is based on real oil and stock market returns given that their prices are characterized as I(1) processes. Table A1 in the Appendix presents the descriptive statistics for the return series for both markets. As it can be seen, stock mean returns are positive and higher than oil market returns but not statistically significant in both cases. In terms of volatility, the oil market volatility is larger compared to the stock market volatility. Broadly speaking, the Jarque-Bera values are high and statistically significant. In the stock market the degree of skewness measured in absolute terms is higher compared to oil market. Most return series have some auto covariances as indicated by Ljung-Box statistics, and all of them present autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) effect, as implied by ARCH LM test. Moreover, the distribution of these is fat-tailed because excess kurtosis is greater than zero. As a result, adopting the VAR(p)-BEKK-GARCH(1,1) model in our analysis seems an appropriate choice in order to take into account any time-varying volatility in clusters. Figure 2 also provides evidence of a time varying volatility for both markets. Worth mentioning is that the oil market volatility in general exceeds the stock market volatility exception being the 1930s crisis (see Figure 3 ). In comparison, the absence of a negative and statistically significant effect from increased geopolitical risk in the case of the S&P500 stock index may be indicating that geopolitical risk is discounted in a more efficient manner by the US market and its agents, suggesting market efficiency when it comes to absorbing and incorporating exogenous shocks. Probing further, it can be seen that the conditional volatility response to geopolitical risk increases. Once again, it could be argued that the latter appears to exert a negative and significant impact only in the case of the oil index but for both volatility models (k 11 , θ 11 ). Nevertheless, geopolitical risk does not seem to directly affect in any significant and statistically meaningful manner stock market volatility. Overall, our findings indicate that when a geopolitical risk shock occurs the market participants in the oil synchronize their trading activity by reducing returns and volatility. Something that is not present in case of the stock market index. As far as the other coefficients in the variance equations are concerned, it can be observed that the stock market presents a higher volatility persistence compared to the oil market examined here (compare the β 11 to the β 22 coefficients). Moreover, given that the α 11 coefficients are higher compared to the α 22 coefficients it can argued that the impact of geopolitical risk associated news on oil variability is appreciably more substantial (see α 11 ) compared to the stock market (α 22 ) implying different investment reactions in the two markets examined.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper used a recently constructed monthly geopolitical risk index (Caldara and Iacoviello, 2016) to investigate the effects of global tension, friction and conflict on the oil-stock markets associations. To this effect two indices were used in the empirical investigation that cover a period longer than a century (1899-2016): the reported above, then one should highlight the mild but noticeable division between the two market indices. In comparative terms, the oil market index appeared to be more significantly affected by the geopolitical tension index in terms of mean return and variability while the stock market index did not, at least not in a similarly pronounced manner. Moreover, conditional covariance between the two markets was significantly reduced with a time lag in the GPR index.
